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L The Conference Albatross
What's in a name? A great deal. The rose would smell far
less sweet if it were called the Lesser Stinkwort. And the UNIs
activities for trade and development might prosper more, were
they not tied to that tearsome thing, a 'Conference' .....Poor
countries present non-negotiable demands; rich countries do not
negotiate; meetings disperse after worthy - but debating-socíety -
resolutions about Suez or Vietnam. Journalists enjoy themselves.
This is not to deny that valuable and serious activities are
being promoted by the UNCTAD Secretariat. It has sponsored research
work on aid-tying and the effects of private foreign investment on
the recipientt s foreign balance. Together with other international
organisations, it has supported the International Trade Centre's
efforts to help poor countries with export promotion. The executive
arm of UNCTAD, the Trade and Development Board, tries, between con-
ferences, to cajole the rich into keeping their promises. Within the
Secretariat, too, the splendid muckraking of the Invisibles Division,
under Dr. Malinowski's care, has exposed the murky practices and
evasions of the price-fixers in international shipping, themselves
co-ordinated by a series of conferences.
Nevertheless, UNCTAD is alone among UN specialised agencies in
that, Regan-like, its foot usurps its body. Not just in image but in
reality, talk drives out action. Quadrennial confrontations of unre-
presentative alites, from ungenerous rich and uncoordinated poor
countries, produce unworkable compromises among nuclear positions.
Between Conferences, the political work of the Secretariat usually
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seems far removed from the patient bargaining by which the GATT's
small staff has so carefully cleared the path of the developed
countries towards reciprocal trade liberalisation.
In that word 'reciprocal', rather than in any difference in
method, lies the key to different degrees of success. GATT promotes
the exchange of advantages; UNCTAD tries to unite the weak to ex-
tract unilateral "concessions" from the strong.....A more patient,
bargaining, even politicised Secretariat ís a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for an UNCTAD freed from showpiece confronta-
tionism and able, by engaging in the search for reciprocal gains
from negotiation, to help "the wretched of the earth". If the Confe-
rence is to be dethroned within UNCTAD, clear guidelines must be es-
tablished for what the Secretariat can usefully do, beyond research
and self-administration. It is the argument of this paper that, in
all the major fields of rich-poor relations, UNCTAD can achieve much
if only it will give more thought to bargaining.
*** *** *** ***
Bargainers, especially weak ones, had better agree before app-
roaching their adversary. UNCTAD is ideally set up to help poor
countries establish - not under hectic Conference conditions but
beforehand1 - common positions promising, insofar as their shared
interests allow, the best chance of gain from negotiations with rich
countries. Sometimes such gain can be achieved by arm-twisting -
threats or acts of expropriation or of new trade restriction. The
structure of world markets and the alternatives open to rich coun-
tries, however, are such that poor countries will usually do better,
as a group, by subtler negotiating tactics, involving an exchange
of concessions.
Whichever applies .....three considerations are often neglect-
ed. First, the poor countries concerned can usually strengthen their
joint bargaining position by preparing for what game-theorists call
"side payments" among themselves. If, as a group, they expect to get
the best bargain from the rich world out of a certain offer, but at
a cost to specific members of the group, the poor gainers can com-
pensate the poor losers, leaving poor countries as a whole better
off than if they had agreed on an offer to the rich world benefiting
am well aware that some pre-Conference consultations restricted
to poor countries take place already - but at a prior conference,
with similar constraints (Algiers before UNClAD II at Delhi in
1968; Lima before Santiago this time).
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all their members only a little . (This is especially relevant to
bargains about trade preferences.) Second, bargains about zero-sum
games are impossible. Given a reasonable degree of knowledge, well-
run nation states do not tolerate risk for nothing, and hence never
embark on such games. Thus international negotiations, about (say)
the entry into a group of poor countries of a multinational company,
imply that all parties believe there is some net gain to be distri-
buted by the results of such a negotiation. Third, and this is where
the GATT procedures help (though, as we shall see, the GATT agree-
ment itself does not), bargaining is not about unilateral concess-
ions but about the distribution of gains.
Some might fear that if UNCTAD engaged in the lengthy advance
co-ordination of an agreed position for poor countries, before it
oversaw their bargaining with the rich world, they would risk expo-
sing their disagreements for exploitation by the rich. But that
certainly happens now, with the present UNCTAD pre-conference arran-
gements; with an UNCTAD Secretariat increasingly experienced in
guiding extensive preliminary secret talks, on specific issues,
among poor countries (as in the initial stages of the currently pro-
mising cocoa negotiations in Geneva), the risk of leaks should be
reduced. Another fear, that representatives of poor countries might
advance the interests of national alites rather than poor people, is
not special to the approach here proposed. Nor can I accept that
poor countries, with their big and growing protected markets, lack
bargaining counters; indeed their preference for jam today seems
naturally bargainable against rich countries' taste for more jam to-
morrow.
However, to get the feel of what might happen if two-stage bar-
gaining replaced zero-sum Conference conf rontationism as the main
focus of UNCTAD activities, we shall have to look at the four main
areas of debate at Santiago, and to ask how they would be approached
differently along the lines here proposed. We must, I fear, start
with the observation that confrontation by moral suasion along the
lines of the three UNCTAD conferences - while it may embarrass some
rich countries - will not produce worthwhile improvements for poor
ones. To be even less useful, the ideas in this paper would have to
be worse than useless
2. The Prospects of Trade Bargaining
The disagreements among rich countries are often blamed for
their failures to make "concessions" to the poor countries at
UNCTAD. This is very convenient. At Santiago Britain can oppose
Third World proposals on insurance, the US on SDRs, France on prefe-
rences, and each can look generous on two issues while substantive
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concessions are effectively vetoed on all three. The truth is that
peaceful international relations are not about "concessions" but
about bargains (aid is a partial exception). If the Conferences, and
the built feelings imposed upon Western civil servants, went on all
the time instead of for a few weeks every four years, some minor
"concessions" could perhaps result; but this is not the case. Nowhere
has the technique of Conference embarrassment proved more useless to
poor countries than in trade. The story of the "generalised prefe-
rence schenid' for the manufactured exports of less developed coun-
tries is both sad and instructive.
At the second UNCTAD Conference in Delhi in 1968, the rich
countries were conveniently (but genuinely) unable to agree on a
list of manufactured exports from which they would grant tariff pre-
ferences to the poor world. They did agree to prepare national lists,
but despite pressure from the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board
they have been very slow about it. The USA has still not finalised a
list, and any impact such a list might eventually acquire has been
far outweighed by the impact of US protectionist measures meanwhile,
in shipping as well as in quota and tariff matters. The EEC has en-
acted a list that provides for tariff preferences within gradually
expanded quotas, for such manufactured goods as EEC imports from
poor countries in miniscule quantities: a procedure described by the
leading specialist in this field (Professor Richard Cooper of Yale)
as "fraudulent". The UK's somewhat more generous list will shortly
be replaced by accession to this fraudulence, as to the Treaty of
Rome itself.
If the mean and abortive preferences, granted to some manufac-
tured exports of some poor countries, represent the failure of Con-
ference confrontationism, the UNCTAD-supervised cocoa negotiations
(even if they do not come off this time) represent a much more
fruitful approach. There is a common interest of producers and con-
sumers in fairly steady, predictable commodity prices, partly to
reduce the requirements for numerous arid costly counter-speculative
stocks. For a poor country where tax revenues depend heavily on du-
ties levied upon one or two exports, predictable prices are almost
essential for planning. The difficulty with international commodity
agreements is to get the right price. If it is set too high, then
low-cost producers will undercut it, evading the agreement if neces-
sary (in collusion with buyers), as with "tourist coffee" smuggled
outside the agreed export quotas of the International Coffee Agree-
ment. A too-low agreed commodity price (a rarer problem) produces
excess demand and again leads to production and sales outside the
Agreement. It is thus very important that producers co-ordinate
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their price tactics, making perhaps more use of side-payments than
hitherto, in advance of negotiations with consumers. But it has to
be emphasised that with tropical commodities we have a clear case of
a joint advantage (from price stabilisation) to be shared between
buyers and sellers: bargains, not concessions.
Commodities produced in both rich and poor countries, such as
sugar and wheat, create a more complex bargaining situation, because
of conflicts of interest within each rich importer; between produ-
cers and consumers. There is little difference, as regards the
structure of the bargaining problem, between these commodities and
manufactures like the various grades of spun cotton yarn. In each
case, there are three parties interested in the outcome of the final
negotiations: the less-developed exporting countries, whose inter-
ests can for these purposes (especially if side-payments are possi-
ble) be regarded as homogeneous;2 producers competing at higher
unit cost with such countries, but based in rich importing count-
ries; and buyers of the products in rich importing countries. Plain-
ly the exporters want freer trade. The producers in the importing
country do not, because although the country gains by having its
skilled labour and savings freed for more efficient use, the means
for 'compensating the losers out of such gains are weak and slow.
The consumers in the importing country clearly gain from freer trade
that cheapens sugar, wheat-bread, shirts, shoes or carpets: however,
(a) they are seldom organised behind an articulate voice; (b) if
they are housewives they are divided in their loyalties insofar as
their husbands are beet- or cereal-farmers, cotton-spinners, shoema-
kers or carpet-weavers; (c) hence they hardly ever form a serious
source of pressure upon negotiators from the importing country. The
Board of Trade, or its equivalent, fully recognises the benefits to
"Britain" from freer trade. The pressures upon it, however, come not
from "Britain" but from employers and trade unions; and, even here,
the interest of industrial and working-class consumers in cheaper
goods and wider choices seldom prevails. It is usually too general,
too long-run, and perhaps in our male-run societies too much felt by
housewives in its immediate impact, for use as an effective politi-
cal weapon.
2UNCTAD could perhaps do more to prevent the spread of export subsi-
dies under circumstances where the producers replaced are likely to
be in poor countries, or where a Dutch auction of subsidies is pro-
bable, or where retaliation by consumers against dumping is likely
and would damage poor countries other than the original subsidiser.
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There are all sorts of things poor countries can do about this,
and UNCTAD is the ideal forum to organise such action. First, as we
shall see, carefully selected private foreign investment by poor
countries, both in each other and in rich countries, can help get
the barriers down; so can some conventional rich-to-poor forms of
movements of private capital. Second, there is much more that poor
countries can do within rich customer countries - in the first in-
stance (though not, one hopes, competitively) through the commercial
sections of embassies and High Commissions. Consumers can be organi-
sed; US, European and UK consumers organisations could be encoura-
ged, informed and perhaps discreetly financed to campaign against
arbitrary protection of inefficient activities, such as shirt-making
and sugar-beet farming, that raise domestic prices and waste resour-
ces; more promisingly, the industrial consumers of restricted im-
ports (carpet-makers who use jute backings, jam-makers who need
sugar), and their unionised employees, could be mobilised to apply
pressure to governments, parliaments and Boards of Trade to point
out that the restrictions imperil their capital and jobs.
Secondly (and in these days of multi-product companies and con-
glotnerates this is most important), poor countries - in the process
of dismantling those parts of their own protectionist structures
that have proved excessive or arbitrary and hence harmful to their
own development1 - should not liberalise unilaterally. Instead, they
should offer to liberalise some im.orts in return tor at least e.ui-
valent advantages tor some exports Multilateralism is probably dead
- killed by the Treaty of Rome, buried in August 1971 by Mr. Nixon -
but remains a splendid and perhaps revivable ideal, beneficial to
almost all, so that poor countries could gain by being prepared to
extend exchanged liberalisation" fairly far, or in principle univer-
sally. Moreover, it is clear that poor countries will gain by coordi-
nating their liberalising approaches, most notably in drawing up
bilateral arrangements with the EEC - and here UNCTAD has a big opp-
ortunity.
Why has it not happened to a large extent already? The amend-
ment to the GATT agreement permitting rich countries to confine non-
reciprocal import liberalisation to poor countries, perhaps, has
helped mislead the latter into expecting this Father Christmas app-
roach. So has the absence of straight talk by rich countries' dele-
gates at successive UNCTAD conferences. These men have repeatedly
11.M.D. Little et al., Industry and Trade in Some Developing
Countries, OECD, 1971; B. Balassa et al., The Structure of Protec-
tion in Developing Countries, IBRD, 1971.
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said, "You deserve unilateral concessions, but we can't afford them
given our balance-of-payments"; or, "but France won't let us". The
reality is that, while aid is nominally (and to some extent genuine-
ly) about unilateral concessions, trade is not. Let swapping commen-
ce
It might well be argued that, since even unilateral trade f ree-
ing normally benefits the importing as well as the exporting country,
the latter need make no concessions to get it. Unfortunately that
argument is reciprocal It is true that the language of trade-
treeing "concessions" is an unhappy mercantilist relic caused by the
domination of Boards of Trade by merchant, rather than free-trading
consumer, pressures. Merchant pressures dominate because of the
serious underdevelopment in rich countries of channels by which some
of the benefit from freer trade can be used to overcompensate dis-
placed merchants and their employees, and to retrain them in lines
of production where the country enjoys a comparative advantage.
This suggests a third area of common concern to poor countries
in their quest for access to rich markets. It is an area where de-
termined UNCTAD diplomacy in rich countries might bring startling
results: the development, within rich countries or trading blocs, of
adequately financed means to redeploy, retrain and resettle the
workers, managers and businessmen whose occupations "go under" as a
result of free international competition. EEC has a model organisa-
tion of this sort in the European Social Fund, but it currently dis-
penses only very small sums, and is confined to adjustment assistan-
ce following displacement caused by the lowering of intra-EEC trad-
ing barriers. There are powerful forces in most Western countries,
especially in the trade unions, who would welcome an extension of
such arrangements, to cover "adjustment assistance" for resettlement
and retraining in response to freeing of trade. UNCTAD might
well work profitably with such interests in rich countries, so as to
secure a major extension of market access by removing some of the
fears that underlie opposition to it.
3. UNCTAD and the Decline of Aid
If trade is an unpromising field in which to extract "concess-
ions" through appeals to the conscience of the rich, aid looks much
more hopeful. For all its distortions commercial, political and
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military, aid retains a genuine gift element.1 Moreover, its econo-
mic rationale - to permit a poor country (despite population growth)
to invest enough to achieve levels of income, and hence savings,
that will ultimately sustain growth without aid - has worked for
several recipients, is perfectly compatible with some altruistic
donor motives, and yet offers the donor gone effective ultimate ret-
urn for bread cast upon the waters, in terms of expanded trade with
a stable and increasingly prosperous recipient. If quadrennial con-
ferences cannot embarrass traders out of their greed, surely they
can embarrass donors to mix more altruism into their enlightened
self-interest?
Yet the chasm between words and action elicited from rich
countries is even wider in aid than in trade. UNCTAD I, at Geneva in
1964, produced agreement in principle (Alp) that developed countries
transfer as aid or private foreign investments, 1% of net national
product (NNP) to less developed countries. UNCTAD II, at Delhi in
1968, produced AlP to raise this to 1% gross national product (a
rise of about 10%), of which seven-tenths was to comprise aid.
UNCTAD III has produced AlP on special earmarkings for least-
developed countries" - defined to exclude Bangladesh (one of the
poorest countries in the world) because of its inconveniently large
population and hence requirements But AlP is not aid. Each year
since 1961, net aid has declined as a share of donor NNP, from 0.54%
in 1961 to a likely 0.28% this year. Private investment by rich
countries in poor ones has fluctuated wildly around an uptrend, but
it is absurd - if convenient to such reluctant donors as the UK - to
add this to aid and form an overall target.....For well known rea-
sons, the inclusion of private foreign investment with aid in a com-
posite target - as if it were all homogeneously controllable gift-
wise, and clear ot reverse flows - is what the Germans call, useful-
ly but untranslatably, "irrefUhrend".
As for aid proper, the truth is that it cannot be demanded.
One can, however, appeal to interest groups within rich countries
that benefit when aid is granted. In particular the move towards
"untying" of aid from purchases in the donor nation - by reducing
the gains to the powerful commercial lobby - will, if successful,
mean reduction of aid. Hence, while untied aid world-wide is a fine
2OECD estimates that about 80% of gross aid comprises "grant
element; i.e. grants plus interest foregone on loans (the latter
discounted from the due date to estimate value at the moment of
loan). Aid, net of repayments of past aid loans, varies around
6,60O million per year. From this, perhaps 15% of gross aid or
$1,000 million must be deducted - the cost of 'tying of most aid
to purchases from the donor, at prices inflated by the removal of
multi-country competition.
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ideal, concentration on "price-policing", to prevent monopolistic
or cartel measures to "price up" tied-aid goods, will surely help
poor countries much more. It could, however, with UNCTAD pressure,
be brought home to donors that untied aid is often needed for tied
aid to work: how can India use British machinery if it lacks foreign
exchange for the import of essential non-British raw materials?
Nor is it clear that the search for softer terms of aid loans
helps poor countries. The choice is bound to be between more hard
aid and less soft aid. According to the overall credit position of a
country, one or the other will be preferable. By opening and reple-
nishing its "soft loan" (1/4%) department, IDA, the World Bank has
moved towards the provision of a whole spectrum of terms-of-aid,
within which donor and recipient choices can usefully be made. ShoÙld
not UNCTAD press for a much swifter move in this direction, covering
bilateral as well as multilateral aid?
A turther common interest of donors and recipients arises out
of the debt position. For a few recipients of aid (India, Nigeria)
past loans, though concessional, have created cumulatively enormous
interest burdens, and drastic softening of new aid is needed if
donors (and world capital markets) are to avoid unpleasantness,
ranging from rescheduling through Pakistan-style unilateral morato-
ria to frank defaults. It is perfectly sensible, as Keynes pointed
out, for debtors to exploit creditors' fear of a plague of de-
faults in order to soften future terms. A commoner case is that
debts have accumulated, not from aid loans, but from costly credits,
tied to overpriced exports, as in Ceylon, Ghana and Brazil. Here
soft aid merely bales out the loan sharks, unless it is part of an
operation to fund short-term debt and to prevent it from mounting up
again. The former requires a quite tough settlement between IBRD (as
the donor consortium) and private creditors in rich countries; these
creditors cannot expect to continue drawing high interest charges if
the donor authority removes the risk of default that alone could
have justified them. The latter requires an improved balance-of-
payments and reserves position in the recipient country. Generally -
in developed as well as underdeveloped countries - lenders have
pressed for unimaginative measures to secure this: measures linked
neither to the structural problems of the recipient's agriculture
nor to the import restrictions of the recipient's overseas customers,
usually the root causes of the bad balance of payments. Straws in
the wind, especially at IBRD, indicate that UNCTAD would have power-
ful allies in the rich world in pressing for a more liberal approach
to "strings".
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So far, we have been looking for improvements within the exist-
ing aid framework. But might UNCTAD press for changes in that frame-
work? Disillusion with aid, and with the development process as a
whole comes not from the inadequacy of poor countries' performance
conventionally defined (income-per-head in the Third World grew at
2.8% per year throughout the 1960s) but from the failure of growth
to spread its benefits to the really poor. Aid has done little to
help - less than 12% has gone to agriculture, less than 1% to family
planning, practically none to non-alite health and education servi-
ces. Several smaller donors, notably Sweden (which has made the con-
tribution to income equalisation a necessary condition for aid) but
also Holland and Canada, have begun to respond to this by restructu-
ring their aid programmes. Insofar as UNCTAD represents poor coun-
tries and not rich alites, it could help speed and spread this
necessary adjustment.
4. Private Foreign Investment and International Money
We have shown that private overseas investment (Pol) is not
aid; but poor countries, especially if they act together under
UNCTAD guidance, can use it to lower or leap rich countries' trade
barriers. There are three possible methods to be considered. Most
familiarly, if ICI or Dunlop sets up shop in a poor country, it be-
comes a powerful source of pressure in the UK (and maybe elsewhere)
for freer imports from that country; such pressures can hardly ever
be confined to products of one particular firm, and may indeed spre
well beyond one particular type of commodity, either because of the
way the rich importers laws are drafted or because of the diversifi-
cation plans of the investing company. All this should be borne in
mind when negotiations about private foreign investment take place;
grants of licences should be ruthlessly used as a lever to obtain a
freer market access to the country of origin. Furthermore, foreign
investing companies often hope to benefit from continued high pro-
tection for their products within the poor country to which they
move - sometimes the continuance (or enactment) of such protection
is one of their conditions for entry. UNCTAD should help poor coun-
tries work out the full implications of such conditions, not only
for increased domestic costs, but also from the loss of present -
and the gain of future - opportunities for bargaining about exchan-
ged liberalisation" on the lines discussed above.
A less familiar use of P01 would involve selective invitations
by poor countries to companies from other poor countries with rele-
vant technology and experience. For example, Hong Kong and South
Korea have been particularly successful in expanding their textile
exports to the USA, UK and EEC. Fashion-consciousness, marketing
skills, and above all the capacity to adjust to and overcome shif t-
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Ing protectionist devices have all helped. Because of their very
success, wage-costs are rising, and their export structures will in-
creasingly shift to slightly more machine-and-skill-intensive lines,
especially light electronic goods. Meanwhile, the managerial ingenu-
ity and experience of Korea's and Hong Kong's textile industries are
of special relevance to India and Pakistan. POl by them in such
countries is obviously indicated.....
Let us now get more fantastic. POl is much lauded by many eco-
nomists in rich countries. Would they welcome some at home, from
poor countries? The latter are very short of capital, yet POl
them could well be indicated in some cases. This applies especially
to commodities such as tea. Value-added in shipping, processing,
marketing and distribution has grown much faster than in production,
and labour-intensively at that. Moreover, producer countries find it
difficult to benefit from improved production techniques (or to use
their bargaining power) because of their separation from the rather
centralised, albeit highly efficient, and vertically integrated
overseas sector that produces much of, and markets almost all, the
commodity. Would not Ceylon gain by owning a major tea processing-
selling outlet in the UK? This is not so fantastic: she could have
purchased one in 1968, and the decision to refrain was as close as
it was mistaken.
Let us now turn from POl as a means of trade pressure to im-
prove a poor country's trade situation. What else do poor countries
seek from it? The love-hate relationship is much discussed, and
understandable. My concern here is with UNCTAD's capacity to improve
poor countries' power to bargain with big overseas companies. Too
often the company's lawyer, accountant and surveyor receive thrice
the pay, and are twice the quality, of their counterparts in the
governments of the poor countries with which they deal. All too
often, especially (as Seers has shown) in the Caribbean, poor coun-
tries compete - via tax holidays and other concessions - to worsen
the terms on which they attract a limited total of POr. In both
these spheres, UNCTAD could improve matters, respectively by acquir-
ing top-rate cadre personnel and by preparing uniform draft agree-
ments for governments of a region to present to POl companies. In
this latter direction the work of Vaitsos for the Andean Pact coun-
tries, in a limited sphere, is a model.
*** *** *** ***
A few words are needed about international monetary arrange-
ments. I seriously question whether poor countries are asking for
the right things. Representation at the top-level negotiations
through formal expansion of the Group of Ten is shadow, not
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substance. Infinitely more important for poor countries is that
rich countries reach a monetary settlement that encourages each of
them to settle its future crises (whether of the current balance-
of-payments or of speculative outflows of reserves) by expanding
exports rather than by contracting ímports. A wave of protectionism
.should be the poor world's real nightmare: as the US, EEC and
Japan restricted imports from each other there would be few exemp-
tions for the poor; as growth contracted, so would aid. UNCTAD shotid
surely be pressing on the rich world the need for a quick, lasting
and expansionist monetary settlement - above all quick, for that,
not representation at the monetary top table, is the chief need of
poor countries .....
Unlike UNCTAD (and most developmentalists), I also doubt wheth-
er the proposals to link aid to SDRs deserve the emphasis they have
received in Santiago. These proposals are a transparent device to
increase aid, an excellent aim, but one not obviously advanced by
unsuccessful camouflage. Both aid and SDR expansion have powerful,
illiberal enemies: why unite them? Moreover, SDR expansion exists
mainly to relieve liquidity shortages. SDRs received as aid, when
spent, will rightly be used to buy the most competitive exports -
which are likely already to have won their producers excellent
foreign balances. Therefore "SDRs as aid" seem likely to direct the
extra liquidity to those developed countries who need it least.
I am not at all convinced that the details of international
monetary settlements are very important matters for the scarce time
of UNCTAD's officers.....Still, UNCTAD might well look into Michael
and Frances Stewart's proposal for the establishment of Third World
monetary arrangements, somewhere between a clearing house and a limi-
ted common currency, to encourage trade among poor countries, which
have huge and largely unexploited potential complementarities. The
very discussion of such arrangements, by presenting rich countries
with an unpalatable alternative to an expansionist world monetary-
trading system, would provide both a potential threat and a poten-
tial concession with which to induce the building of such a system.
is such it is the right note on which to end this discussion: for
I have tried to show how, by the appropriate mixture of exchanges
of mutual advantage with uses of power, UNCTAD could move from
largely futile demands for generosity to the coordination of common
Third World interests into an effective bargaining system.
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